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DEFENSE BUDGETS AND CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT 
 
Jeanne Kinney Giraldo 
 
Introduction 
As countries democratize, newly-elected governments find that they must quickly 
assert control over the budget, especially the defense budget, if they are to meet their 
policy goals for all sectors and assert civilian control over the military.  Fiscally, the 
process by which budget decisions are made should be structured so that defense 
spending does not “break the bank” by exceeding the government’s capacity to pay.  
Sectorally, defense should compete with other government ministries so that the final 
overall budget is a monetary expression of the priorities of the nation, its choice between 
“guns and butter.”  Within the defense sector, the allocation of resources for training, 
personnel, and equipment should reflect the roles and missions for the armed forces 
established during a process of national security planning.  Finally, the power of the purse 
provides civilians with a key lever of control over the military: government preferences 
are more likely to be taken into account when they are backed by the provision or 
withholding of resources.  
 
In addition, the ongoing nature of the budget process, with planning for the next 
year beginning soon after the current year’s budget is approved, can contribute to civilian 
control over the military and effective policy making in a number of ways.   Ideally, it 
encourages a yearly debate on defense policy and forces the making of hard choices that 
might otherwise be postponed.   It can also provide a key venue for legislative control of 
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the defense sector.  The writing of laws that affect the defense sector and the military is a 
periodic event, but the need for the legislature to approve and review expenditures is a 
permanent source of influence.   Similarly, to the extent that a public debate over the 
defense budget occurs, a measure of control and participation by the civilian population is 
introduced into a policy arena that is often closed.    
 
The budget process consists of four stages, analyzed in the body of this paper: (1) 
the formulation of the budget by the executive, (2) its enactment into law by the 
legislature, (3) the disbursement and spending of the funds, and (4) an evaluation of the 
efficiency and effectiveness with which the money was spent.  This paper examines the 
different ways in which civilian and military participation is structured at each step of the 
process, based on the experiences of a wide range of countries at various stages of 
democratic development.1  The impact of these variations on civilian control of the 
military and transparent and effective policy-making is evaluated. 
 
1) Budget Formulation 
For all sectors, the formulation of the budget usually takes place within the 
executive branch and requires two sets of decisions: one about the distribution of funds 
between sectors (e.g., defense, transportation, health) and another about resource 
allocation within sectors.  In most countries, the “center” -- some combination of the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the head of the government and/or the cabinet -- is 
                                                            
1 Countries representing a broad, geographical cross-section are examined: Argentina, Brazil, Germany, 
Great Britain, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and the United States.    
Information on the defense budgeting process is not readily available for most countries, with the exception 
of the United States. 
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responsible for the first decision.2  This decision should reflect both the macroeconomic 
constraints on spending as well as the policy priorities of the government of the day.  The 
second decision, about the allocation of resources within a sector, is the responsibility of 
the relevant line ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Defense).   In making this decision, the 
Minister is guided by input from subordinate service agencies (e.g., the armed forces) and 
the government’s policy agenda for the sector (e.g., national security “white papers”).  
 
Neither decision can be made in isolation from the other.  The Minister of Finance 
will not be able to distribute resources between sectors unless s/he has some sense of the 
needs of each sector.  Similarly, the sectoral minister, who always faces a situation where 
needs exceed limited resources, will not be able to make the hard choices about spending 
unless s/he has some realistic estimate of the amount of money that will be devoted to the 
sector.   As a result, the writing of the budget is usually an iterative process in which the 
center consults ministries about their spending needs and sets spending ceilings, 
ministries submit detailed spending requests based on these numbers, and then the center 
reevaluates their ceilings based on these requests and may choose to reallocate funds. 3  
Any disputes between spending ministries and the MOF are typically arbitrated, either 
formally or informally, by the head of government or the Cabinet.  The ministries are 
                                                            
2 In most presidential systems, with the notable exception of the United States, the MOF sets spending 
limits and the President mediates any disputes between the MOF and line ministries.  In parliamentary 
systems, countries that adhere to norms of “collective responsibility” might have a Council of Ministers, 
rather than the MOF alone, set ceilings. 
3 Ceilings can either be identified at the very beginning of the process or after a first stage when 
preliminary budget requests are made.  It is difficult to set ceilings at the very beginning if the budget 
formulation process is a lengthy one because fiscal constraints are frequently not known with any certainty 
a full year in advance.  However, in countries where spending ministries are not accustomed to moderating 
their requests to some reasonable level (e.g., an incremental increase over the previous year’s spending), it 
is probably advisable to set a firm ceiling from the very beginning.   [See Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and 
Daniel Tommasi, “The Budget Preparation Process,” Asian Development Bank, available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/manuals/govt_expenditure/Chap4.PDF.  Accessed May 4, 2001.] 
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then expected to modify their spending estimates to match the revised ceilings set by the 
center.  The final figures from each ministry are compiled into a draft budget bill that is 
then sent to the legislature for approval.  
 
Setting Spending Limits: The case of defense 
In many democratizing countries, civilian elites have been successful in asserting 
control over the level of the defense budget, often greatly reducing spending (e.g., 
Argentina, Nicaragua, South Africa, the Philippines).   In most cases this can be 
attributed to the general strengthening of the Ministry of Finance relative to all spending 
ministries as countries facing domestic economic crises and the requirements of 
international lending institutions put their fiscal houses in order.  For example, a survey 
of Latin America and the Caribbean showed that 18 of 20 countries in 1993 possessed 
Finance Ministers whose authority was "considerably greater than that of the spending 
ministries on budgetary issues."4   In addition to this motive for reduced spending across 
the board, democratically elected officials often have incentives for cutting the defense 
budget in particular.  In many cases, excesses in military spending under authoritarian 
rule led to a bloated defense budget and it is the task of the newly-elected civilians to 
rationalize spending.  In all cases, democracy brings with it compelling demands for 
increased social spending, which are often answered at the expense of the defense sector.   
 
                                                            
4 Budget directors in each of the 20 countries responded to the survey.  [See Alberto Alesina, Ricardo 
Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, and Ernesto Stein, “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin 
America,” (Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, Working Paper Series 394), 
Table A4.]   
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While fiscal discipline is a welcome and necessary change, the ascendancy of the 
MOF within the executive branch brings with it the danger that excessive or arbitrary cuts 
will be imposed on the defense budget, based solely on fiscal criteria and disregarding 
national security needs.  As David Pion-Berlin argues in the case of Argentina:  
 
national security considerations and fiscal considerations are largely 
divorced from one another, with the latter taking precedence.  That means 
that the military is left ‘out of the loop.’  The flow of budgetary decisions 
does not involve a constant mix of defense and fiscal strategists.  It is only 
after the budget is assembled and approved that the military moves to 
center stage, with planners and programmers figuring out how to spend the 
scant funds delivered to them.  Economists within the secretariat of 
finance are not obligated to consult with defense experts on how the size 
of the budget would impact national security objectives. 5 
 
A number of procedures can help ensure that larger policy considerations shape 
decisions about spending levels.  In most countries, the president or cabinet uses policy 
criteria to resolve disputes between the fiscally-oriented MOF and the line ministries.  A 
politically-connected civilian Minister of Defense with a clearly articulated vision of 
national defense is more likely to be able to influence the MOF and the President than a 
                                                            
5 David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina.  
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 138-39.  Similarly, the Russian 
military has criticized the MOF for making across-the-board cuts of 5% without considering increased 
costs in the defense sector.  Guedes da Costa notes that the Planning and Budget Ministry in Brazil often 
makes "arbitrary" cuts to the defense budget to bring spending in line with funds.  [Thomaz Guedes da 
Costa, “Democratization and International Integration: The Role of the Armed Forces in Brazil’s Grand 
Strategy,” in David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in 
Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe.  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 228.]   
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military minister.6  In some countries, policy concerns are incorporated into the process 
of setting spending limits by consulting relevant stakeholders inside and outside of the 
executive branch prior to establishing ceilings.  In the US, Congressional leaders, 
motivated by a combination of fiscal and policy concerns, often play a more important 
role than the Office of Management and Budget in setting the parameters of initial 
planning in the Defense Department.7  The OMB, in turn, consults the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense about the needs of the sector before any financial decisions are 
made.8     
 
Allocating Resources within the Defense Sector 
Although civilians in democratizing countries have had success in setting the 
levels of defense spending in many countries, on the whole there has been little civilian 
control over the allocation of resources within the defense sector.9  Civilian control over 
                                                            
6 For more on the importance of a civilian Ministry of Defense, see Thomas C. Bruneau, “Ministries of 
Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Center for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper # 
11, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, August 2001). 
7 Personal communication with United States Air Force Major General (Ret.) Richard Goetze, April 3, 
2001.  See also Pion-Berlin, 1997, p. 134, and A. Premchand, “Budgetary Management in the United States 
and in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom,” in Roy T. Meyers, ed., Handbook of 
Government Budgeting, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1999), p. 110. 
8 The OMB is much weaker than the MOF in most countries, leaving room for some ministries to bypass it 
and discuss their budget proposal directly with the President.  Historically, the Department of Defense is 
one of the sectors that has most often negotiated its budget directly with the President (and the Congress).   
[Harry S. Havens, “Budgeting and Policy-Making by the Legislature in the United States,” in Budgeting 
and Policy Making.  (SIGMA Papers No. 8.  Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in 
Central and Eastern European Countries), p. 182.   Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/pubs/pubnos/pubno8.htm.  Accessed May 4, 2001. 
9 This was the case at least until 1982 in Spain where the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces decided, with 
complete freedom, which weapons systems were to be acquired.  [Antonio Marquina, “Spanish Foreign and 
Defense Policy Since Democratization,”  in Kenneth Maxwell, ed. Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy.  
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc., 1991), p. 28.]  Martins and Zirker cite a Brazilian admiral who 
acknowledges that the military has complete freedom to spend their budget as they see fit, as long as 
spending limits are respected.  [Joao R. Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian Military under 
Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis,”  Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42:3 (Fall 
2000), p. 155.]  Cruz and Diamant note for Latin America as a whole that "elected officials, in the main, 
favor streamlining military establishments; but after making resources allocations, they leave the armed 
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this second set of decisions (and effective policymaking) depends upon two related 
factors: a strong civilian ministry of defense and civilian participation in a process of 
national security planning.  In the absence of these factors, the allocation of resources 
within the defense sector is likely to be the product of a power struggle among the 
services pursuing their narrow corporate interests, largely bereft of strategic 
considerations on how best to promote national security.10   
 
It is the task of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to produce a policy statement 
outlining policies and expected outcomes, the way in which objectives will be achieved, 
and performance indicators to measure success.   In most developed democracies, the 
Minister's statement of policy ("white paper") is circulated through the services so they 
can draw up their budgets in line with government policy. For the most part, civilians 
within the MOD provide strategic assessments and military officers provide the 
operational details.  As Pion-Berlin noted in the case of military reform: "The broad 
strokes of institutional reorganization must be painted by the president and his defense 
staff.  Only then can the detail be filled in by the military."11   
 
The creation of a civilian Ministry of Defense is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for civilian leadership in the defense sector.   Civilians within ministries of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
forces to their own devices."  [Consuelo Cruz and Rut Diamant, “The New Military Autonomy in Latin 
America,” Journal of Democracy 9:4 (1998), p. 116.]  
10 Jelezov notes the historical inability of the Soviet armed forces to formulate broad strategic perspectives. 
[Boris Jelezov, Defense Budgeting and Civilian Control of the Military in the Russian Federation.  October 
1997.  (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses), p. 66.]  Pion-Berlin makes a similar observation about 
the Argentine armed forces.  [David Pion-Berlin, “The Limits to Military Power: Institutions and Defense 
Budgeting in Democratic Argentina,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 33:1 (Spring 
1998), p. 102.] 
11 Pion-Berlin, 1997, p. 142 
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defense must take an active role in developing the legal framework, bureaucratic 
organizations, and expertise necessary to perform their leadership role within the sector.  
For example, before the transition to democracy in South Africa, soldiers had great 
influence within the tripartite budget working groups (consisting of MOF, MOD, and 
congressional personnel) and the chief of the armed forces was the accounting officer for 
the group.  After the 1994 creation of a civilian MOD, the Secretary of Defense was 
made the accounting officer, thus giving personnel from the Defense Secretariat more 
influence than the military within these groups.12  In Nicaragua, in contrast, the 1997 
creation of a Ministry of Defense headed by a civilian did little to change the previous 
system in which the budget was the product of an accord between the government’s 
economic team and the armed forces.  Although the MOD was charged with directing 
budget formulation and supervising its execution, it failed to create the centralized 
bureaucratic unit that would perform these tasks.13  
 
In any policy area, executive leadership is often particularly important when 
major reform is required, changes are controversial, or the line ministry is weak relative 
to the subordinate service agencies.  All three of these conditions apply to defense reform 
in democratizing countries, where national priorities and threat environments have 
changed, downsizing is often necessary, and ministries of defense are of recent origin.    
As Pion-Berlin has noted:  
 
                                                            
12 Peter Batchelor and Paul Dunne, “The Peace Divided in South Africa,” manuscript, October 1997, pp. 
11-12. 
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Ultimately, it is the president that must make defense reform a priority.  It 
is he who must instruct his minister to demand from the services full 
compliance with national defense policy.  And it is he who must instill in 
the defense ministry a real sense of purpose and direction…. 
[O]rganizations in general and certainly state agencies in particular are not 
necessarily oriented toward the fulfillment of goals unless they receive a 
clear mandate from above.  In the absence of such a mandate, civilian 
appointees within the agency feel less motivated to bring themselves up to 
speed on issues of national security or to hire outsiders with the expertise 
necessary to confidently push through controversial programs.14 
 
Unfortunately, in many democratizing countries, a sustained debate on national 
security has not taken place and executives find themselves besieged with other problems 
that require their attention.  In Nicaragua, for example, the lack of a debate on national 
security leaves the civilian ministry of defense without clear guidelines to provide to the 
armed forces.15   In Brazil, eleven years after the transition to democracy, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso issued a presidential directive outlining a national security strategy, 
but this seemed to have little impact upon the military-led Ministry of Defense; 16 
economic crises subsequently diverted the President's attention from the issue.   In Brazil 
and elsewhere, however, there are encouraging signs of a movement toward national 
debates on defense issues.  In Brazil, the appointment of a civilian Minister of Defense in 
1999 has initiated a civilian-led and inclusive discussion on national defense.  In Spain, 
plans are underway for the government to issue the country's first white paper on defense, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 Javier Meléndez Quiñónez, El gasto de defensa en Nicaragua: La toma de decisiones en la asignación de 
recursos.  (Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Nicaragua and the National Democratic Institute, 2000), pp. 
33-35. 
14 Pion-Berlin, 1997, p. 169 
15 Meléndez. 
16 Martins and Zirker, pp. 151-152.   
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more than two decades after the transition to democracy.17  Argentina and Chile both 
issued their first white papers in the mid 1990s.  And in South Africa after the transition 
to democracy, a defense white paper was written and a defense review conducted with 
the widespread participation of political parties, non-governmental organizations, the 
defense industry, defense analysts, the Armed Forces, and the public.   
 
In sum, in the absence of a strong civilian Ministry of Defense and a debate on 
national security, decisions about the allocation of resources between sectors are often 
left by default to a fiscally-oriented MOF and, within the defense sector, to the military.  
A national debate on security issues is necessary not only to ensure that funding levels 
are adequate for the sector, but also to contribute to the ability of civilians to control and 
rationalize spending within the sector.   
 
2) Enacting The Budget 
In most countries, the legislature is not a key player in the budget process until the 
second stage, when the executive's proposal must be reviewed, revised, and enacted into 
law.  In some countries, however, the legislature does have some involvement at the 
formulation stage.  In the United States, for example, congressional leaders play a key 
role in setting initial spending limits.  In addition, the executive must take legislative 
preferences into account when formulating the budget, given the Congress' broad powers 
to rewrite the executive proposal.  In Germany, the ministries work closely with their 
respective committee in the Bundestag during budget formulation.  In South Africa, a 
                                                            
17 On Brazil and Spain, personal communication, Professor Thomas C. Bruneau, August 1, 2001. 
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special budget working group brings together representatives from the Department of 
State Expenditure (accountable to the MOF), the Department of Defense, and the 
parliamentary defense committee.18   
 
Once the executive’s proposed budget is submitted to the legislature, it is usually 
discussed in two stages: first, there is a debate and vote on the overall amount of the 
budget and then later a detailed discussion of the allocation of resources among and 
within ministries.  This detailed discussion usually takes place within the Budget 
Committee, which calls on Ministers to defend the budgets for their sectors and 
sometimes invites members of the relevant congressional committees to participate in the 
proceedings.19 The centralized control of the Budget Committee helps ensure that the 
“big picture” of the budget is taken into account (i.e., fiscal limits respected and 
reallocation between sectors coordinated) while consultation of ministers and committees 
permits sectoral input.   
 
The ability and willingness of the legislature to modify the executive’s budget 
proposal varies greatly between countries.  It is greatest in the US, where the Congress 
has complete freedom to modify executive proposals and the incentives to do so (e.g., the 
prospect of obtaining resources for constituencies).  It is weakest, perhaps, in Great 
Britain (and other parliamentary systems where the government is backed by a majority 
party) where a rejection of the budget is seen as a vote of no confidence in the 
                                                            
18 Batchelor and Dunne, p. 12.     
19 This represents the process in most parliamentary and presidential systems; the United States and Great 
Britain are exceptions.  In the United States, the process is extremely decentralized and a great number of 
committees are involved, even after a 1974 reform to create more coherence in the process.  In Great 
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government.20    Most legislatures fall between these two extremes, with many clustering 
closer to the British end of the spectrum.  The role that the legislature plays is limited by 
the factors that shape the overall role of the legislature in the making of defense policy 
and which have been discussed in depth elsewhere.21  In this section, I focus on how the 
specific rules that govern the budget process -- the amount of time the legislature is 
allotted for debating the executive’s proposal, the amount of budget information to which 
the legislature has access, and the powers of the legislature to change the size and 
allocation of the budget – affect the ability and willingness of legislators to shape the 
defense budget.   
 
Time period for budget review 
In most countries, budget debates are charged affairs carried out under great time 
pressure and the knowledge that the proposed budget must be passed before the current 
one runs out, or else.  The amount of pressure the legislature is under and the “or else” 
varies from country to country and has an impact on the ability of the legislature to make 
meaningful changes to the budget.  Typically, the executive submits the budget two to 
four months before the start of the new fiscal year.22  In some countries, however, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Britain, financial powers are held directly by the House and not delegated to the Budget Committee, which 
consequently plays a reduced role.   
20 Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi.  In Great Britain, the Parliament votes on the defense budget in its 
entirety, but there is no tradition of amending expenditures.  This is very different from the United States 
and Germany where individual procurement decisions are frequently the subject of great controversy.  
[Tom Dodd, “Parliament and Defence: A summary of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and controlling 
defence policy and the Armed Forces,”  RUSI Journal, 143:3 (June 1998), pp. 29-35.] 
21 See Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Legislative Control of the Military: The Comparative Experience,” Center 
for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper # 8, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2001). 
22 The budget is usually presented three months in advance in Argentina, Germany, and Spain.  A 1986 
survey of developed and developing countries noted that the average was usually two months.  [“Timing of 
the Budget,” Volume I, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference 
Compendium, Second Edition. (New York: Facts On File Publications, 1986), p. 1068.] 
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legislature is given less time to examine the executive’s budget requests.  In Nicaragua, 
for example, the executive is only required to present the budget by November 15 and it 
must be approved before the end of the session on December 15.23  
 
Most of the close examination of the budget occurs in congressional committees; 
consequently, a large portion of the time the budget is in the legislature should be devoted 
to the committees.  Where it is not, the legislature is unlikely to have effective input into 
the budget.  In South Africa, for example, there is little time for committee deliberations, 
with the Portfolio Committee on Finance allotted only 7 days to submit a report on the 
Budget to the National Assembly, less than one tenth of the four months allocated to the 
entire legislative Budget process.24  In South Korea, the time period for budget review is 
usually less than two weeks of the ninety-day regular session.25  In Germany, in contrast, 
the legislative stage of the budget process lasts four months and the committee is allotted 
several weeks for its work. 
 
What happens if the budget is rejected or not passed by the legislature within the 
constitutionally established time frame?  In most countries, the previous year’s budget is 
put into force.  If this is done on a month-by-month basis while legislative approval is 
awaited, the legislature still has some leverage over the process (e.g., Brazil).  If the 
decision to use the prior year’s budget puts an end to the budget discussion, and the 
                                                            
23 Meléndez, p. 32.   
24 Warren Krafchik and Joachim Wehner, “The Role of Parliament in the Budget Process,” (Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa: Budget Information Service.  No date.)  Available at 
http://www.idasa.org.za/final/publications/Parliament1.htm.  
25 Yeon-Seob Ha, “Public Finance and Budgeting in Korea under Democracy: A Critical Appraisal,” Public 
Budgeting and Finance (Spring 1997), p. 64. 
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government is allowed to redistribute some of the funds, the government has the upper 
hand in negotiations (e.g., Argentina). 26 
 
Access to Information 
Meaningful congressional input into the budget process depends upon the 
legislature having information about the contents of the budget and the policy 
implications of their budget decisions.   For this information, the legislature relies on data 
provided by the executive branch as well as research services housed in the legislature.  
 
The most important piece of information from the government is the budget 
proposal itself, which should have enough details that the legislature understands what 
they are approving or rejecting.  In many countries, however, this is not the case, 
particularly with respect to the defense budget, where claims of the need for secrecy still 
shroud the release of information.  In Mozambique, for example, the government budget 
did not differentiate between defense, police and intelligence allocations until 1999.27  
After the transition to democracy in South Korea in 1987 the defense budget was 
deliberated as a lump sum until 1993.28  In Russia, from 1992 to 1996 the State Duma 
approved a defense budget that was generally one to two pages long and consisted of 
only six to nine spending categories.  In 1997 this was expanded by law, but civilians in 
                                                            
26 Alesina et al. 
27 Martinho Chachiua, “Internal security in Mozambique: Concerns versus policies,” 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/9.1/%20Security%20Mozambique.html, accessed January 4, 2001.    
28 In 1993, three categories were created: category A is an aggregated accounting presented to the National 
Assembly as a whole; Category B items are disaggregated and revealed without restrictions to members of 
the Committee on National Defense in the National Assembly; and Category C items are further 
disaggregated and revealed with certain restrictions to committee members.  [Jong Chul Choi, “South 
Korea,” in Ravinder Pal Singh, ed., Arms Procurement Decision Making.  Volume I: China, India, Israel, 
Japan, South Korea, and Thailand.  SIPRI.  (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 196.]  
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the Duma still tend to consider only the 17-category declassified budget request since 
they lack the security clearances necessary to view the new 300-line format.29  In 
contrast, the US military budget contains 3-4,000 declassified line items and all the 
relevant legislators have security clearances to view the classified items.30  
 
In addition to the official budget proposal, information from the executive can 
also be obtained through regular contact between legislators and government ministries.  
In Germany, for example, the legislative budget committee interacts regularly with 
government departments through regular department briefings and expenditure reports.   
 
Within the legislature, members of the Budget Committee can rely upon their own 
expertise, their committee staff, congressional research services, and input from sectoral 
committees in making their decisions.   Legislators in the US, for example, can rely upon 
a Congressional Budget Office in addition to well-staffed committees.  Unfortunately, 
most legislatures lack access to this kind of specialized knowledge and expertise.31   
 
Defense committees, even in countries with low levels of staffing, are likely to be 
more knowledgeable about the requirements of the defense sector than the members of 
the Budget Committee, and it is important that there is a mechanism for their input into 
                                                            
29 Instead, military officers elected to the Duma, who have the appropriate clearances, oversee the classified 
details of the budget. [ David Betz, “No Place for a Civilian: Russian Defence Management from Yeltsin to 
Putin,” paper presented to the International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, 
March 14-18, 2000.] 
30 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian 
Armed Forces, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 92.  The US intelligence budget, 
in contrast, was classified as secret until 1997.  An excessively detailed budget proposal also can have its 
shortfalls, if budget lines are not grouped together into programs (or in some other fashion related to 
policy) so that the policy consequences of budget decisions are understandable. 
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the budget process. 32   Defense committees in East European legislatures, for example, 
influence the budget either by making recommendations to the Budget Committee, 
having a decisive vote, or presenting to the floor amendments that were rejected by the 
Budget Committee.33  In Russia, the Defense Committee is only given a one-hour hearing 
by the Budget Committee, but it lobbies on the floor for increased spending for the armed 
forces.34  In contrast, in Great Britain the budget does not have to be passed to the 
Defense Committee and, as one member of the Committee has noted: “As far as the 
budget is concerned in the UK, the Defence Committee is almost irrelevant.”35   
 
Powers to amend the budget 
The legal powers of the legislature to amend the budget vary from country to 
country.  At one extreme is the US Congress, which has the power to increase or decrease 
both revenue and expenditure.36  In some countries the legislature is forbidden to increase 
expenditures (e.g., Great Britain), while in others the legislature cannot increase 
expenditures in one sector without taking from another or raising taxes (e.g., post-1993 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
31 For more on this, see Giraldo. 
32 The kinds of legislative hearings which accompany the debate over other pieces of legislation are usually 
not possible, given the time constraints and pressures of the budget process.  However, sectoral committees 
within the legislature should hold consultations and debates throughout the year, which would inform their 
input into the budget process.  The holding of hearings outside the scope of the budget process itself avoids 
delays in getting the budget passed, and might increase the chances that general policy concerns and not 
particular lobbies inform spending decisions.   
33 See Bruce George and Alison Graham, “Defence Committees in Democratic and Democratising 
Legislatures,” paper presented to the Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, Berlin, 
August 1994, pp. 23-24.   
34 Joel M. Ostrow, “Procedural Breakdown and deadlock in the Russian State Duma: The problems of an 
unlinked and dual-channel institutional design,” Europe-Asia Studies 50:5 (July 1998), Table 2.   See also 
Jelezov, p. 53.   
35 George and Graham, p. 18.  Bruce George is the longtime Chairman of the House of Commons Defence 
Committee. 
36 The Nigerian Constitution seems to give similar powers to that country's legislature.  However, when the 
legislature recently tried to exercise these powers, the Executive argued that it was not entitled to do this 
and the legislature backed down.   (Personal communication with Dr. Eva Busza, 24 July 2001.)    
 21 
Argentina, Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Spain). 37   In many presidential systems, the 
president has line item veto power (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, the Philippines).38  
 
In countries where the legislature is unable to increase spending levels (or 
reallocate funds), a military interested in enlarging its share of the budget would focus 
most of its attention on the executive branch and the formulation stage. In other cases, it 
might make sense for the military to attempt to lobby the legislature for increased funds.  
The success of this strategy will depend upon the interest of legislators in participating in 
the debate over defense policy and, in particular, in raising defense spending.   
 
Interest of Legislators in Modifying the Defense Budget 
When evaluating the interest of "legislators" in modifying the defense budget, it is 
necessary first to identify which legislators control the budget process.  It is the interests 
of these legislators, shaped by their electoral and partisan concerns and the choices 
provided to them by the budget rules, that will determine the role of the legislature in 
modifying the defense budget. 
 
Where parties (or factions) are highly organized and disciplined, they are likely to 
control the budget process within the legislature.  Under these circumstances, the defense 
budget will be shaped by the policy positions of the parties (or factions).  In some 
democratizing countries, parties might be committed to “the collective goal of democratic 
                                                            
37 Alesina et al.  On Germany, see Krafchik and Wehner, p. 3.  On the Philippines, see Gabriella R. 
Montinola, “Parties and Accountability in the Philippines,” Journal of Democracy, 10:1 (January 1999), p. 
136. 
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stability and, therefore, to support higher defense expenditures as part of a policy to 
safeguard corporate military interests."39  In other cases, liberal parties (such as the 
Partido Popular in Spain) might support increased military spending for ideological 
reasons.  Often, however, parties will support defense cuts to the extent that they permit 
increased spending in areas important to the public. 
 
Party control over the budget process in the legislature can contribute positively to 
the making of defense policy, particularly when parties are willing and able to debate 
defense objectives and their relation to the budget (and bring to the table a perspective 
that differs from that of the executive branch).  For example, in Germany, many spending 
decisions, especially big-ticket procurement items, are the subject of heated debate in the 
legislature.  In Spain, in contrast, the legislature in 1982 rubberstamped the executive's 
ten-year budget plan for the military without debate, despite the fact that defense 
objectives had not yet been defined.   Debate is more likely where the party in charge of 
the executive does not have a majority in the legislature and where defense issues are 
politically salient and parties possess defense experts.  Unfortunately, in many 
democratizing countries, parties frequently do not have “working teams specifically 
assigned to develop positions on security and defense issues." 40  Despite an initial 
interest in defense issues during the transition to democracy, with the passage of time 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
38 Lisa Baldez and John M. Carey, “Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from 
General Pinochet’s Constitution,” American Journal of Political Science 43:1 (January 1999), p. 43  
39 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers.  (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), p. 99. 
40 Cruz and Diamant (p. 121) argue that this is the case in most Latin American countries. 
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political parties have generally focused on traditional economic and social issues, with 
which they are more familiar and which are electorally more important.41   
 
Where parties are less disciplined, as is the case in many democratizing countries, 
individual legislators will usually control the budget process and will “follow their own 
immediate political interests, for better or worse.”42 The interest of individual legislators 
in modifying the defense budget will depend on the rules of the budget game and the 
impact defense spending has on their chances for reelection.  In some cases (e.g., the 
United States) there is no conflict between attending to constituencies and increasing the 
military share of the budget.   This is because (1) the rules of the budget game give 
individual legislators on defense-related committees a great deal of power over the 
budget; and (2) these individuals often benefit politically from the resources provided by 
the defense budget, because of the presence of military bases, government agencies, or 
private defense companies within their districts.43  In other countries, however, the choice 
that legislators face between attending to constituents in their home district and the 
military is much more stark.  In Brazil, the defense budget provides few resources for 
legislators since the defense industry is geographically concentrated in a small area and 
                                                            
41 For example, the legislature in Nicaragua played a role during the transition in writing the Código de 
Organización Militar, but since then have had little input into the national security planning and budget 
process (Meléndez, p. 38).  Similarly, during the transition to South Africa, defense issues were important 
but have since taken a back seat.  
42 Hunter, p. 99. 
43 The resources provided by the military budget need not benefit a large number of legislators in order to 
have an impact on policy making.  For example, in the United States the creation and findings of the special 
commission on intelligence in 1994 were shaped largely by the interests of one Senator in maintaining open 
the intelligence agencies in his state.  [Loch K. Johnson and Kevin J. Scheid, “Spending for Spies: 
Intelligence Budgeting in the Aftermath of the Cold War,” Public Budgeting & Finance.  Winter 1997, p. 
23.] 
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the congress lacks control over the location of military bases.44   (Many other 
democratizing countries lack a defense industry altogether or it is owned at least in part 
by the government and key decisions about its operation are outside the purview of the 
legislature.)  In addition, since the rules of the budget process force legislators to make 
choices about reallocating funds between sectors, legislators are more likely to favor 
shifting funds from the defense ministry to more electorally-profitable ministries. In 
Brazil, for example, individual legislators are allowed to submit amendments to the 
budget and usually request shifting funds from the military budget to public works.45  In 
the Philippines, these considerations, as well as strong public opinion against 
militarization after years of martial law, have led congressional committees to slash the 
executive's defense budget requests.46   
 
In these cases, military efforts to lobby legislators are likely to be met with 
indifference or hostility.  In Brazil, legislators view membership in defense committees as 
electorally unimportant and presentations by the military have been canceled because of a 
lack of legislative interest.47   In such cases, it is likely that only when nationalist passions 
are inflamed will legislators perceive electoral gain in increasing the military budget.  
This was the case, for example, in the Philippines when Chinese aggression against 
                                                            
44 Hunter, pp. 97-98. 
45 Hunter, pp. 98; pp. 108-109.   
46 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine military’s 
modernization program,” Armed Forces and Society, 26:1 (Fall 1999), pp. 119-137. 
47Martins and Zirker, p. 148; Hunter, p. 107.   
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Filipino claims in the Spratly Islands led the legislature to approve a long-delayed bill 
granting funds for military modernization.48 
 
In sum, legislators in many countries face incentives to cut the defense budget but 
have little motivation to spend their time debating defense policy.  This reinforces the 
trend at the level of the executive, where a strong Ministry of Finance can enforce budget 
cuts and a weak Ministry of Defense fails to articulate a politically persuasive national 
defense strategy.  
 
3) Implementation Of The Budget -- Disbursing Funds 
Once the budget is approved by the legislature, funds for defense should be 
distributed in the manner indicated in that document.  However, this may not be feasible 
if unforeseen needs arise (such as a natural disaster) or there is a shortfall of revenues.  In 
these cases, rules need to be in place for reallocating funds between spending categories 
or for the spending of emergency or reserve funds.  In Argentina, for example, the budget 
can be modified on the government’s initiative, with congressional approval.  In Brazil, 
the government can modify up to 20% of the budget without congressional approval. 49  
In Russia, the President’s Security Council makes changes to the defense budget via 
decrees, which escape the scrutiny of the Duma.50  Regardless of legislative participation 
in these decisions, all changes in resource allocation should be promptly reported to the 
legislature.   
                                                            
48 Cruz De Castro. 
49 Alesina et al. 
 26 
 
The amount of "rectification" of the budget that occurs will vary from country to 
country, with a great deal occurring in France, for example, to little or none in 
Germany.51 Where budget shortfalls are common or inflation erodes the value of assigned 
funds, lobbying by spending ministries for the early dispensing of funds is commonplace 
(e.g., the Philippines).52 
 
This can result in a modification of the allocation decisions made during the 
previous two stages of the budget process.   In Russia, where few rules of the budget 
process are followed, it has been said that there are three budgets: the budget that is 
enacted by the Duma, the monies that the MOF disburses to the MOD, and the amount 
that the MOD actually spends (frequently three to four times the amount budgeted to it).   
 
4) Auditing And Outcome Assessment  
The evaluation or oversight stage of the budget process has two main purposes: 
(1) to determine whether the money is spent in the way the budget says (auditing); and 
(2) to evaluate whether policy goals have been met (outcome assessment).   This section 
discusses each of these purposes and the variety of institutions that usually participate at 
this stage, ranging from those closely linked to the activity being examined (e.g., auditing 
institutions within the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense) to governmental 
institutions independent of the executive, to oversight mechanisms in the legislature, and 
watchdog groups in civil society.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
50 Jelezov, p. 44. 
51Budgeting and Policy Making, pp. 85-86. 
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Auditing of the budget can take two forms: a detailed review of individual 
transactions that results in holding individuals responsible for misuse of government 
funds or an examination of procedures and work practices to determine whether or not 
they are effectively designed to prevent errors and to get the most value for the money.   
The former approach is important, especially in countries where government corruption 
has traditionally been carried out with impunity, because it holds individuals accountable 
for abuses.   However, the latter is especially important, and most auditing institutions 
have shifted to focusing on this, because it leads to changes in the procedures designed to 
prevent wrongdoing in the first place and introduces reporting requirements that increase 
the likelihood of uncovering individual wrongdoing after the fact. 53  In practice, the two 
approaches are likely to go together: a scandal uncovered by the review of individual 
projects or transactions often leads to changes in the procedures that govern decision 
making and the spending of money.   In South Korea in 1993, for example, a legislative 
committee for audit and inspection revealed wrongdoing in a major defense project (the 
Yulgok project, which comprised up to 40% of the defense budget, and whose budget had 
been approved by the legislature in an unitemized format).  This led to changes in the 
procedures for defense decision-making: a special interdepartmental committee was 
established within the MOD, designed to oversee decisions and reduce the opportunities 
for corruption.54 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
52 Interview with high defense official in the Philippine government, January 14, 2001. 
53 Larry O’Toole, Anatomy of the Expenditure Budget.  (SIGMA Policy Brief No. 1: Support for the 
Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries).  Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/pubs/PBNO1.HTM.  Accessed April 25, 2001. 
54 The effectiveness of these reforms, however, is questionable (Choi, pp. 203-204).  Procurement scandals 
are particularly common in the defense realm, given the large amounts of money involved and the high-
profile nature of both the projects and the individuals making the decisions.  On how procurement scandals 
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Outcome assessment is another key component of oversight, but one that is even 
more difficult to carry out than auditing.  This approach focuses on determining whether 
resources spent on defense are in fact contributing to national security; if not, resources 
should be reallocated in the following year’s budget to projects or missions that will 
contribute more to national defense.   Such an evaluation of policy is notoriously difficult 
to make in the field of defense, where a collective good is being provided with few 
indicators of effectiveness.  Whereas a Ministry of Public Works can measure its 
effectiveness in terms of miles of roads built or paved, or a Ministry of Health in terms of 
clinics built and patients served, national defense is more difficult to measure (e.g., 
“number of enemies deterred”?)  Despite the inherent difficulties of measuring the 
effectiveness of defense policies, this issue needs to be debated, policy objectives and 
indicators of effectiveness established, and spending designed to achieve consensually 
agreed upon defense goals.  Unfortunately, in many democratizing countries, this kind of 
debate has not taken place, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of defense 
spending. 
 
Controlling spending and evaluating its effectiveness are enormous tasks that 
need to be carried out by a wide variety of actors, starting with the institution that is 
charged with spending the money.  Internal audit procedures must be in place within the 
military to hold their members accountable for their handling of resources.  In the United 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
have affected decision-making procedures in Great Britain and the US, see Andrew Cox and Stephen 
Kirby, Congress, Parliament and Defence: The Impact of Legislative Reform on Defence Accountability in 
Britain and America.  (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).  On Germany, see Regina H.E. Cowen, Defense 
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States, for example, Inspectors General of the individual services carry out this function.  
In Nicaragua, the state Comptroller has helped the military establish internal audit 
procedures, which seem to operate effectively.55  The Ministry of Defense should have a 
centralized office that monitors and evaluates spending by the individual services.   
 
In addition to these agencies within the executive branch, most countries have 
national auditing offices that are independent of the government of the day and are 
responsible for reporting on government spending.  In some countries, their task is 
limited to auditing spending; in others, it extends to evaluating whether policy goals have 
been met or not.  In Great Britain, the National Audit Office, carries out both tasks.  The 
effectiveness of independent auditors depends on some minimal level of accountability 
within the spending ministry itself.  In Russia, for example, the State Comptroller has 
complained that the military does not produce enough receipts for sale of military 
property and therefore it is impossible to monitor and control military spending.56  
 
Another source of external audit is the legislature.  Few legislatures have the 
resources to carry out oversight of budgets independently.  The US Congress is a 
noticeable exception, with a strong Congressional Budgeting Office, congressional 
staffers who monitor spending on projects of interest to their legislator, and a General 
Accounting Office that has evolved from an organization focused on detailed audits to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany: Politics and Organization.  (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1986). 
55 Meléndez, pp. 40, 46. 
56 Ulrich, p. 92. 
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one that plays a broader role in evaluating policy effectiveness.57  In many countries, 
including the US, the legislature depends heavily upon information generated by the 
executive’s internal audits and the national auditing office.   Through legislation, 
assemblies require the executive to report on their spending.  In Great Britain, for 
example, the Ministry of Defense produces accounts, which are audited and sent to the 
legislature in January. 58  The Budget Law passed in 2000 in Nicaragua requires the 
executive to send spending reports to the Assembly each trimester.59   In addition, there 
are often provisions for the legislature to review reports of government and military 
activities produced by independent auditing agencies.   Within the legislature, these 
reports are usually reviewed by specialized committees.  In parliamentary systems a 
Public Accounts Committee frequently performs an auditing function; however, its lack 
of expertise in different subject areas prevents it from carrying out an outcomes 
assessment.  This typically falls to the sectoral committees (e.g., the defense committee).  
For the findings of these committees to have an impact on the subsequent year’s budget 
decisions, there needs to be a mechanism for these findings to be reported to the Budget 
Committee (such as the integration of the Public Accounts Committee into the Budget 
Committee) or to the executive during the formulation stage.  In addition, reports from 
the executive and independent auditors need to be received in a timely fashion so that 
they can be analyzed and findings integrated into the next year’s budget.60  
                                                            
57 For a short history, see "The Background and History of GAO," available at 
www.gao.gov/about/history.html, accessed May 15, 2001.  For a more detailed analysis, see Harry Havens, 
"From Auditing to Policy Analysis: The Work of the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the United 
States," in Budgeting and Policy Making.   
58 Dodd, p. 3. 
59 Despite this requirement, legislative monitoring of public spending in Nicaragua tends to be sporadic 
(Meléndez, p. 39). 
60 Since 1982, the National Audit Office in Great Britain has published an annual Major Projects Report, 
focusing on arms procurement (comparing costs and dates with those projected). However, this is not 
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In many policy areas, organizations in civil society often play a watchdog role 
and call attention to government abuses of power or to policies that need rectifying.   
These groups, however, tend to be weakest in the area of defense and, in particular, they 
lack the expertise and access to information often necessary to monitor budget 
decisions.61   In Russia, for example, the defense budget was openly published and 
accessible to citizens only beginning in 1998, and the amount of information supplied 
was minimal.62  Just as the legislature is dependent on a certain level of executive 
accountability to carry out its oversight responsibilities, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) depend on the ability of political parties and legislative committees to secure 
information from the executive.  Unfortunately, parties and legislators often have few 
incentives to secure this information, for reasons discussed in the preceding section.   
 
In addition to domestic NGOs, the international community has begun to play 
an important role in overseeing government spending in the defense realm.  Adherence to 
treaties sponsored by international organizations like the United Nations or Organization 
of American States often requires providing data on military spending and arms 
transfers.63   In other cases, bilateral or multilateral agreements designed to lessen 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
received by the Public Accounts Committee until twelve months after the end of the fiscal year and is not 
available to the rest of the Parliament and general public for another five months (Dodd, p. 5). 
61 Even in the United States, where non-governmental organizations are strong and information on the 
budget relatively accessible, the monitoring of the defense budget is a formidable challenge.  For a 
discussion of the challenges encountered by two leading NGOs to monitor just one portion of the defense 
budget -- spending in Latin America – see  Latin American Working Group and Center for International 
Policy, “Findings and Recommendations from the 1998 edition,” Just the Facts: A civilian’s guide to US 
defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean.  (Available at 
http://www.ciponline.org/facts/find99.htm.  Accessed May 5, 2001.) 
62 Ulrich, p. 92. 
63 For example, countries provide arms transfer data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.  
In June 1999, members of the Organization of American States signed an Inter-American Convention on 
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regional tensions might lead to increased transparency in defense spending (e.g., a 1998 
agreement between Argentina and Chile to fund jointly a comparison of defense 
spending). To the extent this information is made public, domestic NGOs can use it in 
carrying out their watchdog role.  In still other cases, unilateral donor-aid recipient 
requirements might play a role in forcing a measure of responsibility in defense spending.  
US legislation, for example, requires a civilian audit of military receipts and expenditures 
(with results reported to a civilian authority) before US executive directors at 
international lending institutions can vote in favor of non-humanitarian assistance to any 
country. 64    (The audit need not be publicized, however, and therefore contributes little 
to the ability of other organizations to monitor the government.)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition.  Unfortunately, many of the efforts of international 
organizations to collect data of military expenditures are largely unsuccessful.  For example, the annual 
questionnaire on defense spending distributed by the UN Center for Disarmament Affairs received 
responses from only 20 countries in 1996, down from 33 in 1992.   [See Paul George, “Defence 
Expenditures in the 1990s: Budget and Fiscal Policy Issues for Developing Countries,” Bonn International 
Center for Conversion Conference Paper.  Available at www.bicc.de/general/events/devcon/george.html.  
Accessed May 4, 2001.] 
64 Legislation referenced in Department of State, Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1999: Indonesia.  
Available at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/99_amiex2.html.  Accessed March 12, 2001. 
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The daunting task of overseeing the defense budget is made even more difficult 
by the existence of secret funds earmarked by the executive for defense spending but 
largely free from legislative oversight.  Sometimes the secret funds are clear line items in 
the budget (e.g., for intelligence programs) and the legislature acquiesces to them without 
knowing their content (e.g., Argentina, Brazil).  In other cases, the executive hides 
military expenditures in civilian portions of the budget (e.g., Argentina, Russia).65   
 
While these secret funds are beyond legislative control, off-budget funds earned 
directly by the military escape civilian oversight altogether and can undermine state 
policy and democratization.   In Nicaragua, for example, officers are “major agricultural 
producers and highly competitive building contractors.”66 In Indonesia, it is estimated 
that the military receives 75% of its income from its participation in off-budget, profit-
making enterprises.67   
 
Conclusion 
In sum, despite the success of many countries in reducing the amount of money 
spent on defense, democratically-elected civilians and their representatives have been less 
capable of controlling how the money is spent or ensuring that the allocated funds meet 
the nation's security needs.  How can this uneven performance be explained?  In part, it 
                                                            
65 This is a common practice in Russia, where it has been said that specific budget data was more readily 
available in the late 1980s under communist rule than it is today (Ulrich, pp. 86-87).  In Argentina, money 
spent on arms in 1995 was hidden under general Treasury expenditures, since the government’s official 
position was that it wasn’t making weapons purchases.  [Thomas Scheetz, “Transparency, Accountability 
& Rational Decision Making in Defense Expenditures: The Argentine Case,”  (Bonn International Center 
for Conversion conference paper, February 12, 1998).  Available at 
www.bicc.de/general/events/devcon/scheetz.html.  Accessed on March 4, 2001.] 
66 Cruz and Diamant, p. 118.   
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can be attributed to extensive debates countries have had on economic policy and 
government spending and the relative lack of attention to national security issues.  A 
sustained debate on national security issues can make a number of contributions to the 
budget process: it permits indirect public participation in what is otherwise a rather 
closed process of budget formulation;68 it informs the MOF’s decision about allocation of 
resources between sectors; it guides MOD’s decisions about spending within the defense 
sector; and it establishes the criteria necessary to evaluate whether a given resource 
allocation has contributed to policy objectives.    
 
The pattern of control over spending levels but not choices can also be explained 
by variations in institutional strength: many democratizing countries have been able to 
develop strong Ministries of Finance, responsible for fiscal discipline, but the institutions 
responsible for the content of defense spending are noticeably weaker.  Civilian 
Ministries of Defense are of recent origin in most democratizing countries and have yet to 
develop the expertise, the procedures, or the legal powers to orchestrate a national 
security planning process that will inform budget decisions.   Executives often find their 
energies devoted to solving economic or social problems (or putting out fires in the 
defense sphere) and lack the time or political capital to expend on the comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
67 Theodore Friend, “Indonesia’s Year of the Blue Carpet, Plus Several Pathologies and Five 
Personalities,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, December 6, 2000, p. 3. 
68 As Falk and Shapiro note in their advice to NGOs attempting to influence the budget process, 
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reform of the defense sector that is often necessary in democratizing countries.  
Legislatures are often unable and unwilling to participate meaningfully in a national 
debate on defense issues.  Finally, organizations in civil society, which could add a 
different perspective to the national debate on defense and have an interest in monitoring 
government spending, are weak or non-existent.   Actors interested in increasing civilian 
control over the military and in improving the quality of national defense should 
contribute to a debate on national security and work to strengthen the institutions 
responsible for linking defense priorities to the budget process. 
 
 
